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STANDING GRANTED TO NONRESIDENT
PLAINTIFFS TO CHALLENGE
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK
GRANT APPLICATION
Abandonment of inner-cities and the growth of urban sprawl pro-
duce major problems for American cities.1 Congress enacted Title I
of the Housing and Community Development Act of 19742 (HCDA)
primarily to aid in "the development of viable urban communities,
by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and
expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and
1. C. HAAR, D. IATRIDIS, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA 9-11 (1974); M.
SCHUSSHEIM, THE MODEST COMMITMENT TO CITIES 11-20 (1974); Marett, Social
StratFcation in Urban Areas, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS 172-89 (1973);
Schnore, Social Classes in Cities and Suburbs, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AR-
EAS 189-231 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976). Actually the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act is an eight-title omnibus bill. Only Title I-Community Development,
and a few sections of Title II-Assisted Housing, pertain to this Comment.
Title I creates a scheme for dispersing federal money to local governments, combin-
ing nearly all of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) prior
grant programs.
Communities receiving federal grants can spend the money only on activities listed
in Title I. § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 5305 (1976). The principal eligible activities include
acquisition of real property which is blighted, needs rehabilitation, or is for public
works; construction or repair of public works; housing code enforcement; clearance
and rehabilitation; relocation payments incident to Title I activities; provision of pub-
lic services; and costs to develop and administer the program. Id. For discussions of
the HCDA, see H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POL-
ICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 59-78 (1975); The CDBG
Training Advisory Committee, An Advocacy Guide to the Community Development
Block Grant Program, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE R. 601 (January Supp. 1979); Fishman,
Tile I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 7 URB. LAW. 189
(1975).
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moderate income."3 To ensure community compliance with this
goal, Title I sets out detailed application requirements,4provisions for
3. § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (1976). Section 101 also lists specific purposes.
The most important ones are as follows: (I) elimination of slums and blight; (2) code
enforcement, demolition and interim rehabilitation; (3) "conservation and expansion
of the Nation's housing stock in order to provide a decent home and a suitable living
environment for all persons, but principally those of low and moderate income;" (4)
improvement of community services; (5) increase the "diversity and vitality of neigh-
borhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of
lower income; (6) stimulation of private investment in areas with declining popula-
tion. Id. The purpose of deconcentration of housing opportunities marks the first
time Congress has directed its attention to economic rather than racial segregation.
See, H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEvIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAK-
ERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 64-65 (1975).
4. § 104, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304 (Supp. 1979), which states in part:
(a) No grant may be made. . . unless an application shall have been submit-
ted to the Secretary in which the applicant-
(1) sets forth a summary of a three-year community development plan which
identifies community development needs and . . . objectives which have devel-
oped in accordance with areawide development planning and national urban
growth policies;
(2) formulates a program [stating proposed activities and costs] . ..
(3) describes a program designed to-
(A) eliminate or prevent slums, blight, and deterioration . . and,
(B) provide improved community facilities and public improvements ...
and;
(C) improve conditions for low- and moderate-income persons residing in or
expected to reside in as a result of existing or projected employment opportuni-
ties in the community . . . and foster neighborhood development in order to
induce higher income persons to remain in, or return to, the community;
(4) submits a housing assistance plan which-
(A) accurately surveys the condition of the housing stock in the community
and assesses the housing assistance needs of lower-income persons. . . residing
in or expected to reside as a result of existing or projected employment opportu-
nities in the community...
(B) specifies a realistic annual goal for the number of dwelling units or per-
sons to be assisted, including (i) the relative proportion of new, rehabilitated, and
existing dwelling units, and (ii) the sizes and types of housing projects and assist-
ance best suited to the needs of lower-income persons in the community, and
(C) indicates the general locations of proposed housing of lower-income per-
sons, with the objective of (i) furthering the revitalization of the community
..., (ii) promoting greater choice of housing opportunities and avoiding undue
concentrations of assisted persons in areas containing a high portion of low-in-
come persons. ..
(6) provides satisfactory assurances that, prior to submission of its applica-
tion, it has (A) prepared and followed a written citizen participation plan. ..;
(B) provided citizens with adequate information concerning the amount of
funds available. . .; (C) held public hearings. . .; (D) provided citizens with
an opportunity to submit comments concerning the community development
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periodic review,' and remedies for noncompliance.6 Title I, however,
performance ... but nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to restrict the
responsibility and authority of the applicant for the development of the applica-
tion and the execution of its community development program.
(b)
(2) an) grant shall be made only on the condition that the applicant certify to
the satisfaction of the Secretary that its Community Development Program has
been developed so as to give maximum feasible priority to activities which will
benefit low- or moderate-income families or aid in the prevention or elimination
of slums or blight ....
(c) ...
The Secretary shall approve an application. . . unless-
(1) on the basis of significant facts and data, generally available and pertain-
ing to community and housing needs and objectives, the Secretary determines
that the applicant's description of such needs and objectives is plainly inconsis-
tent with such facts or data; or
(2) on the basis of the application, the Secretary determines that the activities
to be undertaken are plainly inappropnate to meeting the needs and objectives
identified by the applicant . . or
(3) the Secretary determines that the application does not comply with the
requirements of this title, with specific regard to the primary purposes of princi-
pally benefitting persons of low- and moderate-income or aiding in the preven-
tion of slums or blight .... or other applicable law or proposes activities which
are ineligible under this title.
The Secretary may not disapprove an application on the basis that such application
addresses any one of the primary purposes described in paragraph (3) to a greater or
lesser degree than any other, except that such application may be disapproved if the
Secretary determines that the extent to which a primary purpose is addressed is
plainly inappropriate to meeting the needs and objectives which are consistent with
the community's efforts to achieve the primary objective of this title. Id. The applica-
tion receives automatic approval within 75 days of receipt unless the Secretary in-
forms applicant of specific reasons for disapproval. Id. § 5304(f).
The requirement of a housing assistance plan is an important innovation in federal
housing policy. The location of assisted housing is now left largely up to the commu-
nity, as long as it promotes a greater choice of housing and avoids excessive concen-
tration of low- and moderate-income persons. H.R. REP. No. 93-1114, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess 8 (1974). This is a substantial shift away from control by federal officials. Hear-
ings on H.R. 1036 and HR. 7277 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I at 311 (1973) (testimony
of HUD Secretary James T. Lynn). The application and review procedures are to
ensure continuity with prior federal housing and community development policy.
HR REP. No. 93-1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). Congress also wanted to sim-
plify application procedures that had been a bureaucratic disaster. Id. at 7 and 57.
It is important to note that HUD has the burden of showing the insufficiency of the
application-The Secretary shall approve an application unless . . ." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5304(c) (Supp. 1979). The regulations indicate that HUD will question the informa-
tion given by the applicant community. Fishman, Title I of the Housing and Commu-
nit' Development Act of 1974, 7 URB. LAW., 189, 212; 24 C.F.R. § 507.306(b) (1979).
19801
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does not provide for judicial review of applications for Community
Development funds.7 This omission hinders a plaintiffs ability to
contest the adequacy and approval of a community's application be-
cause courts refuse to hear the challenge based on the standing doc-
trine.' In a recent decision, Coalitionfor Block Grant Compliance .
Department ofHUD,9 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan surprisingly granted lower-income persons
standing to challenge a Title I grant.
In Coalition, the inner-city plaintiffs"° claimed HUD illegally ap-
proved the community development block grant application of a
nearby suburb." The court found that one of the primary purposes
of Title I was to require cities to plan for the needs of low- and mod-
Literature on the performance of HUD supports this conclusion. E.g., Kushner, Liti-
gation Strategies and Judicial Review Under Tile I of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 137 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304(d) (Supp. 1979). Each grantee must submit an annual re-
port assessing performance in view of the application's objectives. The Secretary
must review the program at least once a year to make sure it conforms to the require-
ments of the Act and other relevant law. Id.
6. Id. §§ 111, 5311. Subsection (a) allows the Secretary to terminate or reduce
payments; subsection (b) permits referral by the Secretary to the United States Attor-
ney General for civil action. Subsection (c) concerns procedures for review, Section
5311 only deals with remedies for noncompliance due to misuse of the grant funds.
7. Another way to attack the sufficiency of an application is by administrative
complaint. See Kushner, supra note 4, at 65-67. The chances for success are obvi-
ously limited when the Secretary has already approved the application. Id.
8. See Warren, Commentary--The Housing and Community Development Act."
Two Years After Hartford, 30 AD. L. REv. 549 (1978). See generally Kushner, supra
note 4.
9. 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
10. The individual plaintiffs were low-income, minority residents of Detroit. The
Act does not define low-income. HUD regulations define low- and moderate-income
families as "families whose incomes do not exceed 80% of the median family income
of the area as determined by the Secretary .. " 24 C.F.R. § 570.3(o) (1979). Low-
and moderate-income persons are "persons for whom the income of the family con-
forms with the definition of lower-income families as established in paragraph (o)
.
.Id. § 570.3(p).
1 1. The Coalition for Block Grant Compliance filed administrative complaints
with HUD after the submission of the initial application by the City of Livonia. The
Coalition claimed that the city's Housing Assistance Plan failed to set forth adequate
goals to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income residents and those "expected
to reside" in the city. The regional HUD office notified Livonia of the deficiencies
and recommended disapproval of the application. City officials met with HUD ad-
ministrators in Washington and submitted a revised Housing Assistance Plan.
Agency inaction resulted in the application's approval. The Coalition again com-
plained to HUD, emphasizing the inadequate "expected to reside" figures. HUD
[Vol. 18:281
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erate-income persons such as the plaintiffs. 2 Therefore, the allega-
tion that the application inadequately planned for the low- and
moderate-income persons "expected to reside" 3 in the suburb consti-
tuted injury in fact.' n The court also found that plaintiffs were per-
sons within the zone of interests protected by the statute.'5
Standing to sue is one of the threshold questions in any lawsuit. 16
The court must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to a judicial
determination of the dispute's merits or particular issues within the
dispute. 7 In federal court the legal basis for standing rests primarily
took no further action until this suit was filed. Coalition for Block Grant Compliance
v, Department of HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43, 46 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
12. Also plaintiffs were three community organizations. The court denied stand-
ing to two organizations composed solely of other organizations because they lacked
members who suffered injury. The local chapter of the NAACP, however, had stand-
ing because it alleged injury to one of its members. 450 F. Supp. at 52, n.14.
13. § 104(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1979). The "expected to
reside" figure is an important part of the Housing Assistance plan. See note 4 supra.
The figure is important for two reasons. First, it forces the applicant to account for
lower-income workers who would reasonably be expected to move into the commu-
nity if suitable housing was available. Determination of the figure at the time of the
Coalition case depended on present and future employment opportunities within the
community. 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2) (1977). The 1978 regulations drop this stan-
dard and go to one of reasonableness. 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(ii) (1979). For ex-
ample. lower income-persons that commute to work in the community but cannot
afford housing there qualified as one "expected to reside." U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development Housing Assistance Plan: General Instructions for
Forms HUD 7015.8 thru .11 (August 1976) (the instructions in effect at the time of the
application of Coalition defendant suburb). The requirement of accounting for those
'expected to reside" in the community furthers the purposes of combating economic
segregation, see note 3 supra. and facilItating rational areawide developmental plan-
ning. Note 4 supra and H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEWIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE
FOR POLICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 63 (1975).
Second, many applicants have found the figure difficult to determine accurately,
making it particularly prone to challenge. City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury,
561 F 2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc); City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D.
Conn 1976). See note 55 infra.
14 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
15. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152-54 (1970).
16. See general, P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 150-205 (2d ed. 1973); K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 22.004-.007 (Supp. 1977); Albert, Standing to
Challenge .4dministratie Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief 83
YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalsis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
17. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975). Theoretically, standing should not
depend on the merits of plaintifis allegation of illegal conduct. But the source and
1980]
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on the case or controversy requirement of Article III.18 Current stan-
dards minimally require the plaintiff to, "'allege such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy" 9 as to warrant his invoca-
tion of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
remedial powers on his behalf."2 A personal stake assures that the
dispute is concrete2' and cast in an adversarial context proper for
judicial interpretation.22 The Supreme Court expresses the constitu-
tional minimum requirement as the presence of a "distinct and pal-
pable injury"23 to the plaintiff and a "fairly traceable" 24 "causal
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct. 21 5 An
alternative formulation of the causation requirement is whether the
plaintiff would benefit from relief granted by the court.26 Beyond
this constitutional minimum, court-made rules of standing further
limit access to federal court.27
When asserting the violation of a statutory duty by administrative
nature of the claim are often crucial. Id. at 500. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 99 (1968). See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 156 (1973).
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-200 (1962)
(claim of failure to reapportion state voting districts for 60 years clearly arises under
the Constitution and is a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of Article III).
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
20. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
21. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
22. Id.
23. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
24. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977).
25. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'l. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).
26. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976). See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Env'l. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978).
27. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-97 (1974) (Powell, J. concurring) (gen-
eralized grievance does not warrant jurisdiction); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17, 20-22 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1953); Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1943) (third-party standing). For a discussion of the related con-
cepts of justiciability, ripeness, mootness, and advisory opinions, see H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 150-205 (1973). The
Supreme Court gives various reasons for these prudential limitations. These barriers
to access to the federal courts arise from beliefs about the courts' limited role in the
federal system. For example, courts fear that lowering the threshold for standing
could inundate the courts with frivolous suits, thereby undermining reliance on the
political process. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
[Vol. 18:281
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action," a plaintiff may base standing on either (1) a particular stat-
ute providing for judicial review of the action in question,29 (2) the
violation of a right created by the statute," or (3) the right to act as a
representative of the public interest.3 ' The Supreme Court in 1970
28. In some situations administrative action may be nonreviewable. Eg.,
Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411 (1965) (Congress intended
to permit agency discretion on desirability of proposed holding company because
agency has the requisite expertise). Liberal interpretations of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, see note 29 infra, have created a presumption in favor of reviewability.
The leading case is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (there must
be pervasive reason to believe that Congress intended to cut off review). See also
Rusk v. Cart, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962) (clear and convincing evidence necessary to
preclude review).
29. Sometimes these provisions grant the right of review only on narrow and ex-
plicit questions. E.g., the Federal Trade Comm'n Act, 15 U.S.C.A.§ 45(c) (1976)
(anyone subject to a cease and desist order by the Commission may obtain review in a
United States court of appeals). Typically, however, the statutory provision is
broadly drawn to include "any person aggrieved" or "adversely affected." E.g., Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f) (1976); Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1(20) (1976). Interpretations of these broad provisions fall within category
three (3). See note 31 infra. See also Scott, supra note 16, at 654-58. One of the
broadest of these interpretations is Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972). The Supreme Court granted standing to two white tenants living in a
housing complex owned by a landlord who allegedly discriminated against nonwhite
tenants. The plaintiffs were persons "who claim to have been injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice" under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(a) (1976). The Douglas majority characterized the situation as public interest
standing. 409 U.S. at 24.
30. These cases arise when a statute creates certain duties or standards of conduct
for the government without also creating any private judicial remedies for enforce-
ment. See Scott, supra note 16, at 649-54. Professor Albert suggests that the basis for
the spread of these actions is due to (1) legislative "intent to protect or benefit a class
of persons" and (2) "the inadequacy of other administrative or judicial remedies to
prevent or redress the harm." Albert, supra note 16, at 454. These interests lead the
courts to imply a private cause of action. See, e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964) (private remedy implied under securities law as necessary to protect federally
secured right), In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) the Court
granted standing to a private utility challenging TVA expansion as violative of the
TVA Charter. The utility had a right to be protected from TVA competition because
that was the purpose of the disputed provision of the charter. The Court did not
address the government's argument that protective intent should not, by itself, confer
judicial remedies to private parties except by citing two cases involving a statutory
judicial review provision. Id. at 6. See Albert, supra note 16, at 451, n.104. See also
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
31 This notion of "public interest" standing or "private Attorneys General" be-
gan in F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The radio station
sought review of F.C.C. authorization of a comparative station. The Court granted
standing under a judicial review provision even though neither the statute involved
nor common law recognized a right to be free from competition. The Court con-
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attempted a general reformulation of standing for review of govern-
ment action:32 "the question is whether the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the [plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision in
question."33 The plaintiffs in that case based standing on the general
right of persons aggrieved by agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),34 possibly creating a fourth category. Unfor-
tunately, the Court has never clearly explained either the zone of in-
terest test or APA standing, forcing commentators and the lower
federal courts35 to look, as best they can, to subsequent decisions for
cluded that Congress' enactment of the judicial review provision indicated an intent
to allow licensees injured by competition to sue the F.C.C. because they are the only
persons interested enough to go to court. Id. at 477. See Scripps-Howard v. F.C.C.,
316 U.S. 4 (1942); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated asn ool,
320 U.S. 707 (1943). Courts have struggled with reconciling public interest standing
with the limitations imposed by the case or controversy requirements of Art. IIl. See
notes 17-27 and accompanying text supra. For an excellent account of the cases, see
Albert, supra note 16, at 476-93. The Supreme Court, however, has clearly indicated
that the constitutional minimums for standing apply to plaintiffs seeking to protect
the public interest. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (Sierra Club has no
standing to represent the public interest in conservation without a particularized in-
jury caused by the challenged project). Cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed in note 29 supra.
32. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (companion case).
33. 397 U.S. at 153.
34. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). Section 702 reads: "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief thereof." The
chapter does not apply when a statute specifically excludes judicial review, or the
action "is committed to agency discretion by law." Id. § 701. To be reviewable the
action must be final. Id. § 704. Plaintiff must also exhaust all other remedies before
he can go to court. Id.
Commentators criticize the court's use of the zone of interest test for APA standing
because it goes well beyond the meaning of the statute when enacted in 1946. The
general understanding was that "legal wrong" refers to the old legal interest test used
in cases without a statutory provision for judicial review. "Adversely affected or ag-
grieved. . . within the meaning of a relevant statute" refers to interpretations of spe-
cific statutory review provisions. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225
F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 230, 413, 415 (1946) (views of then Attorney General Clark). For
alternative readings of section 702, see Albert, supra note 16, at 453 n. 105; Scott, supra
note 16, at 659.
35. Professor Davis argues that the test is unworkable given the Court's lack of
further explanation and may no longer be good law. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 22.02-.1 1 (Supp. 1977). The Court has not applied the test
since 1970. Only rarely have the lower federal courts denied standing based on the
[Vol. 18:281
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guidance.36
The majority of Supreme Court standing cases in the 1970's,
whether statutory or constitutional claims, focuses on injury ques-
tions. For example, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization,37 indigents38 claimed an illegal Internal Revenue Service
revenue ruling39 caused denial of free hospital services. The ruling
held that to qualify as a charitable institution, the only service hospi-
tals must offer to those who cannot pay is emergency room treat-
ment.4" The Court denied standing, claimed under the APA, because
plaintiffs failed to show that the ruling resulted in the denial of serv-
ices or that relief would probably result in such services. 4 '
The Simon majority applied principles set forth in Warth v. Sel-
din. 2 In Warth, low- and moderate-income plaintiffs43 claimed a
nearby suburb's exclusionary zoning4 practices purposely excluded
zone of interest. While three circuits have openly criticized the test, most lower fed-
eral courts merely mention the test without analysis. Id.
36. Duke Power v. Carolina Env'l Study, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), indicates that the
test may no longer apply to constitutional claims. Plaintiffs, persons living near the
proposed site of a nuclear power plant, contended that the congressional limitation of
liability for nuclear accidents was unconstitutional. The Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and the utility asserted that, in addition to an allegation of injury and a
causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct, plaintiffs must
demonstrate a nexus between the injury and the constitutional rights asserted. The
Court refused to extend this nexus test outside the limited context of taxpayer stand-
ing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, did not require anything more than a
demonstration of "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury to satisfy the 'case or controversy'
requirement of Art. III." 438 U.S. at 79. The opinion did not mention the zone of
interest test. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 260-61 (1978).
37 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
38. Individuals, an unincorporated association, and several nonprofit corpora-
tions were plaintiffs. Id. at 32. The organizational plaintiffs were all representing
their low-income members.
39. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1959-2 C.B. 117, interpreting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954). The
previous revenue ruling required that a hospital serve those who cannot pay "to the
extent of its financial ability." Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
40. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1959-2 C.B. 117.
41. 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976). The allegations were "purely speculative." Id.
42. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
43. Individual plaintiffs included nonresident taxpayers, minorities, and lower-
income persons. A member of one organizational plaintiff attempted to build moder-
ate-income housing in the defendant suburb. But at the time of trial the project was
no longer active. Id. at 497.
44. For cases granting standing to challenge exclusionary zoning, see Arlington
1 980]
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racial and ethnic minorities.45 The Court denied standing, finding
the lack of lower-priced housing resulted from the economics of the
housing market, not from defendant's actions. Regardless of any in-
jury, each plaintiff failed to allege "specific concrete facts demon-
strating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he
personally would benefit in a tangible way from the Court's interven-
tion."46
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,47plaintiffs
raised a nearly identical claim.48 The Court granted standing be-
cause the suburb denied the rezoning petition of a developer actively
seeking to build low-income housing.49 Relief, then, would result in
a substantial probability that the developer would build suitable
housing in which the individual plaintiff could reside.5" This
probability established the necessary causal relationship between the
exclusionary zoning and the injury.5'
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (standing as plaintiffs
granted to nonresident and builder); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th
Cir. 1970) (resident and nonresident plaintiffs granted standing); NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975) (resident and nonresident plaintiffs granted standing under a state statute).
45. Plaintiffs also alleged the town boards acted in an arbitrary and discrimina-
tory manner by delaying and denying proposals for low- and moderate-income hous-
ing. 422 U.S. 490, 495 (1975).
46. Id. at 508.
47. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
48. The suburb denied a petition for rezoning to build a lower-income develop-
ment. Black individuals and the developer alleged that the motivation for the denial
was racial discrimination. Plaintiffs specifically claimed violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1976). 429
U.S. at 254.
49. The developer also had standing because it spent money on plans for the pro-
ject and had an interest in making low-income housing available. The black plaintiff
was necessary to the allegation of racial discrimination. Id., at 262.
50. The black plaintiff commuted to work in the defendant community and lived
in a five-room house with his mother and his son. Id. at 264.
51. The important standing decisions since Arlington Heights are Orr v. Orr, 99 S.
Ct. 1102 (1979) (husband granted standing to claim state alimony statute unconstitu-
tional because men, but not women, must pay alimony even though one method of
relief, state extension of alimony rights to men, would not benefit the plaintiff); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Env'l. Study, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (discussed in note 36 supra)
and Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (state com-
mission to promote the sale of Washington apples had standing to challenge a North
Carolina statute requiring only United States grades on containers of apples sold in
North Carolina).
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Evans v. Lynn 52 further illustrates Warth. Nonresident minority
plaintiffs challenged HUD grants for construction of a sewer facil-
ity5" and the preservation of a swamp as a recreation area.54 Plain-
tiffs asserted that HUD, in not evaluating the recipient town's
development policies, failed to perform its affirmative duty to effectu-
ate anti-discrimination in programs receiving financial assistance.
The federal court of appeals dismissed plaintiffs' injury claim because
plaintiffs failed to show that they unsuccessfully sought housing in
the town, or that the approved grant money could go to any project
that would make more suitable housing available." Any injury or
benefit was even more remote and speculative than the claim rejected
in Warth.16
Several lower federal courts have granted standing to challenge
HUD's approval of applications for community development grants.
In NAACP v. Hills," a district court granted standing based on an
allegation that members of plaintiff organization were unable to live
in adequate housing within their community. The relief requested,
ordering the city to spend more of its grant on rehabilitation or acqui-
sition of property for construction of low-cost housing, would benefit
plaintiff's members." Together, these two findings were sufficient to
meet the Warth tests.59
52. 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir, 1975) (en banc).
53. Id. at 573. The grant for the sewer was made in 1969 under the Community
Facilities and Advance Land Acquisition Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3102 (1970).
54. 537 F.2d at 573. The grant for acquisition of the swamp was made pursuant
to the Outdoor Recreation Program Act. 16 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970).
55. 537 F.2d at 573. The antidiscrimination statute is 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (Supp.
IV 1974). Plaintiffs also claimed violation of a similar requirement with respect to the
government's fair housing policy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608(c), (d)(5) (1976).
56 537 F.2d at 595, The fact that the suit was brought under a particular statu-
tory grant does not avoid the constitutional injury requirement of Warth. Id. at 592.
See notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-
94 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974).
57. 412 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
58. Id. at 106.
59. Id. Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Embry, 438 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Penn.
1977) (granted standing in a situation similar to NAACP v. Hills, following the Warth
reasoning). In Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp.
783 (E D. Tenn. 1975), low- and moderate-income residents living in blighted areas of
the city challenged the eligibility of several proposed community development pro-
grams Defendants contended that the threatened injury was not casually related to
their conduct. Even if the challenged projects were found ineligible those funds might
not be spent on projects that would benefit plaintiffs. The court refused to accept this
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The facts of City af Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury6" closely re-
semble those of Coalition. The city and two of its low-income resi-
dents challenged HUD's approval of block grants to several of the
surrounding suburbs. Plaintiffs claimed the submission and approval
of the suburbs' applications without considering those "expected to
reside"'" violated Title I. The circuit court denied standing because
it was improbable that any lack of compliance would affect the plain-
tiffs.6" The basis for this denial was the factual finding that an in-
crease in the "expected to reside" figures would not increase the
number of available housing units.63
The Coalition plaintiffs are nonresidents, like the individual plain-
tiffs in Warth64 and Arlington Heights.65 The Coalition court found
Warth inapplicable because plaintiffs did not base their injury claim
on an inability to live in the suburb, but that the suburb failed to
adequately plan for their needs as Congress intended. 66 This reason-
ing indicates that the Coalition court believed HUD violated a right
to planning created by the HCDA.67 Having avoided Warlh, the
court found that only an allegation of injury and of the right to plan-
ning that meets the zone of interest test was necessary for plaintiffs'
argument because, then, no low- or middle-income plaintiffs would have standing to
challenge improper allocation of Title I grants. 404 F. Supp. at 788.
60. 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc). The district court granted standing.
408 F. Supp., 889 (D. Conn. 1976). The court of appeals agreed. 561 F,2d at 1032-48
(2d Cir. 1977). The appeals court en bane denied standing based on Warth, Arlington
Heights, and Simon . Eastern Ky.
61. See note 13 supra, for a discussion of the "expected to reside" figure. A HUD
memorandum allowed applicants to obtain approval without an "expected to reside"
figure on the first-year application because of difficulties in estimating the figure. Sev-
eral of the defendant towns then submitted an "expected to reside" figure of zero. 561
F.2d at 1041.
62. 561 F.2d at 1051. One of the crucial factors in this decision is that defendant
town's housing assistance plan fully used all available funds for low-income housing
subsidies.
63. Id. In addition, the court found the "expected to reside" figure not to be a
"goal for the future which communities are required to satisfy, but merely a predic-
tion of what is going to happen." Id.
64. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
65. 492 U.S. 252 (1977).
66. 450 F. Supp. 43, 51 (E.D. Mich. 1978). The unplanned-for needs are the fail-
ures to plan for housing for lower-income persons "expected to reside" in the commu-
nity. Id.
67. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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standing."8 Allegations of illegal agency action, however, do not
make the Warth tests inapplicable.69 Assuming there is a right to
planning, plaintiffs must still show the constitutional minimum of in-
jury in fact and probable benefit from relief.7"
The Coalition plaintiffs claimed that defendants' illegal actions
would deprive them of housing opportunities outside low-income ar-
eas, in violation of Title L To establish an injury claim a plaintiff
must allege facts that support an "actionable causal relationship"72
between the asserted illegal action and the injury. Plaintiffs alleged
two facts to support this causal connection: (1) they were among
those "expected to reside"7 within the meaning of Title I, and (2)
they desired to live in the suburb. Neither pertinent case law nor
interpretations of Title I suggest these are sufficient grounds for
standing.
Plaintiffs are not, and probably will not be, among those "expected
to reside" in the suburb. The "expected to reside" figure, according
to HUD regulations, is "a result of existing or planned employment
facilities"74in the applicant community. No Coalition plaintiff
claimed that he or she worked, or expected to work in the suburb.7s
Unless the regulation was invalid, HUD has no duty toward plaintiffs
implied from Title .76 Other cases concerning HUD's duty under
68. 450 F. Supp. at 51.
69. See the discussion of Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., notes 37-41
and accompanying text supra. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'l. Study, 438
U.S. 59, 2620, 2630 (1978).
70. A detailed discussion of the applicability of the zone of interests test is beyond
the scope of this Comment. The test is difficult to apply. See notes 33-36 supra. The
Coalition court simply asserts that the test is met, implying that it is not important to
the grant of standing. 450 F. Supp. at 51.
71. 450 F. Supp. 43, 47 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
72. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507 (1975). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (1976). See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
74. 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2) (1977).
75. Multiple Defendants' Brief m Support of Summary Judgment at 19-20.
76. The Coalition opinion does not mention the regulation. The Housing and
Community Development Act does not define "expected to reside."
The 1978 regulations changed the standard. 43 Fed. Reg. 41, 8467 (1978) (to be
codified in 24 C.F.R. § 570.206(b)(2)(ii) (effective August 1, 1978).
The application now must indicate the needs of lower-income families "who could
reasonably be expected to reside in the community." Id. Subsection (A) sets forth the
particular statistical method for calculation. HUD may, at its option, require a more
precise means for the determination. Id. § 570.306(b)(2)(iii).
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Title I, where plaintiffs reside in the applicant community, do not
support standing for nonresidents who do not even work in the com-
munity. For example, in NAACP v. Hills,78 the court specifically
found that relief would probably result in potential rehabilitation of
the plaintiffs' homes or acquisition of property to build low-income
housing for theplainiffs.79 Surely the suburban municipality cannot
be expected to plan for the housing needs of all lower-income persons
in the surrounding metropolitan area.
The Coalition plaintiffs attempted to distinguish themselves from
other lower-income persons in the area by claiming a desire to live in
the suburb. They did not show, however, that they seriously sought
such housing." In Evans v. Lynn" l the Second Circuit found the
plaintiffs' failure to seek housing in the suburb receiving HUD grants
supported the conclusion that plaintiffs were in no way injured by the
allegedly illegal grants.8 2
The Warth plaintiffs did seek housing in defendant suburb. The
Supreme Court carefully noted the unsuccessful attempts by the
plaintiffs to find housing," but then denied standing on unrelated
grounds.84 This suggests that, absent these unrelated grounds, the
demonstration of exclusion would be sufficient to establish an injury
claim." Even if such a showing would be sufficient it would not have
aided the Coalition plaintiffs' claim. The cursory search for housing
77. The cases challenging Title I applications are: Philadelphia Welfare Rights
Org. v. Embry, 438 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1977); NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F.
Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). See notes 57-59 and accompanying text suqra.
78. 412 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
79. Id. at 106.
80. Multiple Defendants' Brief in Support of Summary Judgment 19-20. One of
the plaintiffs engaged in an "eyeball" survey of housing in the suburb and rejected it
as too expensive. Id. at 20. Another considers the suburb a desirable community and
would like to live there. Id.
81. 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc). For discussion see notes 52-56 and
accompanying text supra.
82. 537 F.2d at 595.
83. One of the Warth plaintiffs searched the surrounding suburbs for a period of
two years. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 503 n.14 (1975).
84. The Court found that plaintiffs' inability to reside in the suburb resulted from
the economics of the area housing market and not from the defendants' allegedly
illegal acts. Id. at 506. Plaintiffs also failed to show that if relief was granted, one of
the other plaintiffs would construct a housing project in which the plaintiffs could
reside. Id. at 505-06.
85. The Warth majority never denied that plaintiffs were excluded from the sub-
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made by the Coalition plaintiffs fell far short of the substantial efforts
made by the Warth plaintiffs.
8 6
To have standing plaintiffs must show, in addition to injury in fact,
that the relief requested would have a substantial probability of bene-
fiting plaintiffs.8 7 The Coalition plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin
the receipt or expenditure of the community development grant. 8
According to Warth, this relief must produce a substantial
probability that suitable housing would become available for plain-
tiffs. This is unlikely to occur. Even if the municipality amended its
application 9 the use of the grant funds could only produce a mini-
mal increase in available housing for two reasons. First, Title I funds
cannot be spent on actual construction of new housing.9" This fact
was crucial to the Second Circuit's denial of standing in City of Hart-
ford v. Towns of Glastonbury." The Coalition plaintiffs also fail to
allude to any specific housing assistance92 or rehabilitation that could
urb, but only that exclusion was not due to exclusionary zoning. Id. at 507. See the
dissent of Justice Brennan. Id. at 523-26.
86. Compare notes 80 and 83 supra.
87. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
88. 450 F. Supp. at 45.
89. Defendants pointed out that the time period for the application's amendment
was about to expire. Therefore, there was a chance that if the court enjoined expendi-
ture of the funds they would be lost altogether. The Coalition court did not care. Id.
at 50. The possibility of losing the grant was one of the reasons the second circuit
denied standing in City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1977) (en banc). Plaintiffs would not benefit if Title I funds were not allocated for
that year. The Coalition court did not consider this possibility when it discussed
standing. The suburb did, in fact, lose the grant as a result of the injunction issued by
the Coalition court.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 570.201 (1978). There is one excep-
tion to the rule. Housing can be constructed with Title I funds as a last resort under
§ 206 of the Uniform Relocation and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4623(b), 4626, 4635 (1976).
The Coalition plaintiffs claim that only new construction of federally subsidized
housing will accomodate the needs of those "expected to reside" in the suburb. 450 F.
Supp at 47. But the decision does not mention that plaintiffs intended to claim that
the grant funds fall within the exception to the rule. Title I applications must, how-
ever, contain goals for new construction to give HUD a picture of the applicant's
overall development plans. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(4)(B)(i) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 570.304(b)
(1978).
91 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir, 1977) (en bane).
92 The allocation of funds for housing, assistance uses the housing assistance
plan Low Income Housing, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). Upon receipt of an application
for housing assistance the Secretary of HUD must notify the local government to give
it an opportunity to object to the application as inconsistent with the Housing Assist-
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benefit them if the suburb submitted a proper application. A court of
appeals, in Evans v. Lynn, found a similar claim93 "amount[ed] to
pure speculation and conjecture." 94
The Coalition decision is important because it avoids the strict
tests" of Warth, allowing inner-city residents to challenge the valid-
ity of community development grants to the suburbs. Unfortunately,
the grant of standing is unsupportable. Standing for nonresident
plaintiffs would alleviate some of the weaknesses of Title 1,96 and
prevent its abuse.97 The Coalition court evidently avoided the stric-
tures of Warth because it took seriously the congressional view em-
bodied in the Housing and Community Development Act, that the
problems of inner-city blight are the responsibility of the whole ur-
ban community.98
John Cowling
ance Plan. Id. § 1439(a). In allocating assistance funds the Secretary must consider,
among other things, the lower-income housing needs set forth in the Housing Assist-
ance Plan. Id. § 1439(d). The use of the plan does not, however, support the Coali-
lion plaintiffs' claim. They are challenging Title I funds, not Housing Assistance
funds.
93. 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (en bane).
94. 537 F.2d at 595.
95. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES (Supp. 1977).
96. See discussion and authorities cited notes 2 and 4 supra.
97. For example, Honolulu, Hawaii, plans to spend $9 million of its $12-million
grant for one year on a new town outside the city. The plan assess $1.2 million for
recreation facilities such as tennis courts, a skating rink, and recreation buildings, No
funds are allocated for preservation of existing housing even though the Housing
Assistance Plan indicates 17,000 dwelling units suitable for rehabilitation. Kushner,
supra note 4. Consider also the approved application of Knoxville, Tennessee.
Knoxville planned to spend money on a feasibility study of hosting the 1980 World's
Fair, and on the renovation of a theater. Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v.
Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (claim dismissed because it was not
ripe). The Coming, New York government, used nearly half of its first-year funds on
the construction of an indoor skating rink. Kushner, strura note 4, at 44 n.3 1.
98. The court is unwilling to look "behind that Congressional decision to hold
that plaintiffs are not really benefited by the" Housing Assistance Plan. "If these
plaintiffs lack standing, there will be no one able to enforce Congress' intent. We will
not assume that Congress passed a statute it knew could not be enforced, especially as
to a provision that is such an integral part of the statute." 450 F. Supp. at 51.
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